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iT e influences of strategic
management on antitrust discourse
BY HILLARY GREENE* & DENNIS A. YAo**
This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit from
ideas developed in the academic strategy field. Because accurate
assessment and prediction of the effects of firm conduct depend in
part on understanding individual firm capabilities, knowledge from
the strategy field and other business fields complements the
contributions from industrial organization economics (10). These
business fields also offer theoretical and empirical challenges to the
10 paradigm, which dominates antitrust analysis. The article begins
with a comparison between strategy and 10 and then illustrates how
the strategy field can contribute to antitrust merger analysis. The
article then assesses the influence of the strategy field on antitrust
law and scholarship based on a citation analysis, which reveals little
evidence of influence. It concludes with an examination of the likely
impediments to the diffusion of strategy field ideas into antitrust.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of antitrust law is to "protect economic freedom and
opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the market-
place."' Determining whether a firm has engaged in anticompetitive
conduct depends on whether the activity impairs, or would impair,
the functioning of the marketplace resulting in harm to welfare. Over
time, antitrust law has relied increasingly on teachings from indus-
trial organization economics (IO) to provide theory regarding how
markets work and to provide tools for either measuring or predicting
the competitive effects at issue.
While antitrust has integrated 10 into its policy and legal determi-
nations, we argue that antitrust has not sufficiently relied upon com-
parable teachings from the academic business fields despite their
relevance to the actions being scrutinized.' Business fields such as
marketing, operations, organizational behavior, and strategy examine
diverse subjects including the decision making, performance, and
organizational processes of firms. All of these fields contribute to sub-
jects that are critical to making antitrust determinations. In practice,
however, those contributions have arguably received less attention
from the antitrust community than is deserved, in part because the
fields do not prioritize research that seeks to further antitrust goals.
While many contributions from strategy (as well as from other
business fields) complement those of IO, sometimes its contributions
1 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Mission Statement, avail-
able at www.justice.gov / atr / about/ mission.
2 Dennis A. Yao, Commissioner, Federal Trade Comm'n, Prepared
Remarks Before the Illinois State Bar Association and Chicago Bar Ass'n (Dec.
2, 1992) (on file with author); Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust:
Towards a Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures,
46 ANTITRUST BULL. 919 (2001); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and
the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 283, 283-84 (2001); Norman
W. Hawker The Public Policy of Antitrust and Strategy: An Overview, 21 J. PUB.
POL Y & MARKETING 257 (2002); Albert A. Foer, The Third Leg of the Antitrust
Stool: What the Business Schools Have to Offer to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
21, 49 (2003); Thomas B. Leary, The Dialogue Between Students of Business and
Students of Antitrust: A Keynote Address, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 5 (2003); Felix
Oberholzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust-What Role for Strategic Manage-
ment Expertise?, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1457 (2010).
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offer theoretical and empirical challenges to 10 and, by extension, to
IO-based antitrust analysis. The divergence between 10 and the strat-
egy field reflects, in part, the latter's heavy reliance on disciplines
other than economics. We believe that the business fields provide
valuable frameworks and insights that would assist in improving
antitrust theory, making key factual determinations, including those
undergirding competitive effects analysis, and predicting the effects
of various proposed antitrust remedies.
This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit
from ideas developed in the academic strategy field, which has as its
focus how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage over their
rivals. While surveying the entire range of business fields and their
respective capacities to contribute to antitrust analysis is beyond the
scope of this article, many of the arguments framed with regard to
strategy would apply to other business fields as well.3
Part II begins with a brief description of strategy scholarship and
how it compares to 10 scholarship. In comparing economics, and par-
ticularly IO, to the strategy field, we use mainstream 10 as our point of
reference and focus on the first-order differences that characterize each
field. We recognize that research in 10, and for that matter in strategy,
is heterogeneous and that exceptions to our characterization are
inevitable. Part III illustrates how strategy insights can prove valuable
in the context of antitrust merger review. Part IV offers some prelimi-
nary evidence concerning the direct influence of strategy on antitrust
law and scholarship. The statistics show that the influence of strategy
is quite limited, though some weak evidence suggests that strategy's
influence may be increasing. Part V assesses how ideas from the strat-
egy field can influence antitrust law and suggests which types of ideas
and analyses are more likely to be adopted. Part VI concludes.
II. THE STRATEGY FIELD AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
ANTITRUST
Part II describes the focus of the strategy field and summarizes its
relationship to IO with a particular emphasis upon key differences
See Gregory T. Gundlach, Joan M. Phillips & Debra M. Desrochers,
Antitrust and Marketing: A Primer and Call to Research, 21 J. PUB. POL'Y & MAR-
KETING 232 (2002).
792 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 59, No. 4/Winter 2014
between them.4 It then delineates, in general terms, the value to
antitrust from greater engagement with the strategy field. While strat-
egy and 10 represent two distinct fields, their relationship is complex
because they effectively overlap on various points; there are diverse
perspectives within each field; and the contours of each field, their rela-
tionship to each other and to antitrust continue to change over time.
A. Understanding strategy's relationship to industrial
organization economics
The strategy field examines how firms achieve and sustain com-
petitive advantage over their rivals. Its primary focus is individual
firm performance-a firm's ability to create and to capture value and,
ultimately, to sustain supranormal profits. Most strategy research
operates at the firm level and adopts as its baseline assumption that
firms in the same industry typically have important differences in
terms of their capabilities and frequently their strategies.' These dif-
ferences, in turn, explain the distribution of profits among firms
within an industry. In contrast, 10 research focuses primarily on mar-
ket structure and market performance and operates largely at the
industry level of analysis.' Because the focus is at the market-industry
level, specific differences among firms are not emphasized.
Importantly, strategy is an inherently multidisciplinary field. It
draws heavily from the disciplines of economics and sociology and, to
a lesser extent, from psychology, as well as from applied business
fields such as organizational behavior, marketing, and technology
management. Owing to this reliance on such eclectic disciplines and
fields, strategy scholarship variously reflects both the rational actor,
See Dennis A. Yao, Business Strategy from Alternative Perspectives, 12
ANTITRUST 16 (1998).
5 A "strategy" is defined in the literature as a plan that specifies the
product and geographic space in which a firm competes and how the firm
will achieve competitive advantage in that space. See, e.g., DAVID J. COLLIS &
CYNTHIA A. MONTGOMERY, CORPORATE STRATEGY: A RESOURCE-BASED APPROACH
(2d ed. 2005).
6 We use the terms market level analysis (used more frequently in IO
and antitrust) interchangeably with industry level analysis (used more fre-
quently in the strategy field and which could include multiple markets).
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optimizing approach of IO as well as the behavioral perspectives of
sociology and psychology. Several different schools of thought char-
acterize the strategy field. This heterogeneity reflects, in part, the
strategy schools' differing emphases regarding economic and behav-
ioral factors. Schools with comparatively greater reliance on econom-
ics include the positioning and resource-based approaches. The
evolutionary school exemplifies a more behaviorally based approach.
The positioning school analyzes firms as bundles of intercon-
nected activities (such as logistics, operations, and marketing) that
serve a targeted set of customers through a particular strategy.' A
firm's current position necessarily reflects tradeoffs just as it would
incur costs if it sought to reposition itself to serve other customer seg-
ments or serve current customers in a different manner. The costs
associated with (re)positioning are highly fact-specific and can range
from modest to prohibitive. Firms optimize competitive advantage by
honing their individual activities to build positively reinforcing inter-
actions among the activities and to eliminate or modify activities that
customers insufficiently value.'
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV school)' focuses on the
importance to firm performance of possessing and utilizing scarce
resources which, when combined with more commonplace resources,
7 Michael E. Porter, What Is Strategy?, 74 HARV. Bus. REv. 61 (1996), and
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985). The positioning school
started as an application of IO to firm performance questions and, as such,
many important aspects of this school follow directly from IO principles. For
example, Porter's well-known "five forces" analysis adapts value capture
dynamics in a manner consistent with economic principles. Michael E. Porter,
How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, 57 HARV. Bus. REV. 137 (1979) [here-
inafter Porter, How Competitive Forces].
8 One important variant of the positioning school, value-based busi-
ness strategy, uses an added-value concept to predict how a consumer's will-
ingness to pay for a product (that is, the product's total value) is divided
among the vertical chain participants that produce and deliver the product to
consumers. Adam Brandenberger & Harborne Stuart, Value-Based Business
Strategy, 5 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 5 (1996).
9 Birger Wernerfelt, A Resource-Based View of the Firm, 5 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 171 (1984). See also COLLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 5, for an
excellent summary of the RBV school.
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create a firm's distinctive capabilities."0 Resources include tangible
assets or intangible assets such as brand loyalty or implicit production
know-how. Resources can include production and decision-making
knowledge that is embedded in organizational and decision routines
as well as formal and informal organizational structure itself.
The more economics-based schools of strategy, of course, share
common baseline assumptions with 10. This is particularly true of the
positioning school in which the attractiveness of positions is deter-
mined with reference to market structure and market competition.
The RBV school focuses more directly on the firm itself, but its key
resource-based construct is also defined with reference to many mar-
ket-oriented considerations such as competition and imitation. Both
of these schools also assume at least a modest degree of rational deci-
sion making. This use of economic logic and analysis makes their
respective teachings relatively complementary to those of IO.
Albeit to varying degrees, all strategy schools incorporate behav-
ioral factors into their explanations regarding sustainable firm profits.
These factors include myopic decision making and bounded rational-
ity, the (noneconomic) nature of social interactions, various types of
individual and group decision biases, as well as various organiza-
tional forces. For some schools, however, behavioral considerations
figure more prominently. The evolutionary school, for example,
stresses the importance of boundedly rational decision making and
local search. 2 According to this school, firms typically make choices
10 Key capabilities are also termed core competencies. C.K. Prahalad &
Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 79
(1990) use a firm's ability to miniaturize components as an example of a core
competence. Strategy scholars have also emphasized the central role of
dynamic capabilities that allow a firm to change its capability set to better
handle a quickly changing environment. See, e.g., DAVID J. TEECE, DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES & STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (2009).
H Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capa-
bilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383, 389 (1992).
12 The evolutionary school of strategy derives from the behavioral theory
of the firm (RICHARD CYERT & JAMES MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
(1963)), with strong influences from evolutionary theorists in both economics
(RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
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over a small set of options and exhibit limited foresight. Some firms
will even "satisfice." The creation of productive and market knowl-
edge is considered firm-specific and path-dependent which, in turn,
implies that knowledge and production capabilities will differ across
firms within an industry. Furthermore, the school assumes that a por-
tion of a firm's productive knowledge is understood implicitly and is
therefore difficult for firms to imitate or even exchange."
As one moves from the more economics-based schools to the more
behaviorally oriented schools, such as the evolutionary school of
strategy, the differences with IO increase. Economic mechanisms such
as competition and economic incentives coupled with assumptions
regarding optimization and foresight are increasingly deemphasized,
while behavioral assumptions regarding myopic decision making,
organizational dynamics, and social network structures are increas-
ingly emphasized.14 Work in the behavioral tradition may directly
challenge the predictions of economics and provide alternative
answers to questions posed in the 10 literature, as well as introduce
different questions."
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion regarding significant
variations between various strategy-based schools of thought, the
CHANGE (1982)), and sociology (PHILIP SELZNIcK, TVA AND THE GRASS RooTs: A
STUDY OF POLrICS AND ORGANIZATION (1949); GLENN R. CARROLL & MICHAEL T.
HANNAN, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF CORPORATIONS AND INDUSTRIES (2004)). The
school rejects the general neoclassical economics assumption that firms glob-
ally maximize. See, for example, Giovanni Gavetti, Daniel Levinthal &
William Ocasio, Neo-Carnegie: The Carnegie School's Past, Present, and Recon-
structing for the Future, 18 ORG. Sci. 523 (2007), for a critical review of develop-
ments in the behavioral theory of the firm.
13 Gabriel Szulanski, Exploring Internal Stickiness: Impediments to the
Transfer of Best Practice Within the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 27 (1996).
14 Some strategy research emphasizes entrepreneurship as a key process
for value creation. Because of the difficulties associated with discovering and
implementing game-changing ideas, such research generally emphasizes
behavioral constraints as well. See, e.g., Giovanni Gavetti, Toward a Behavioral
Theory of Strategy, 23 ORG. Scl. 267 (2012); W. CHAN KIM & RENtE MAUBORGNE,
BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY: How TO CREATE UNCONTESTED MARKET SPACE AND MAKE
COMPETITION IRRELEVANT (2005).
15 See supra note 12.
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field of strategy writ large can be understood in terms of certain core
perspectives that differ from those characterizing the 10 field. Toward
that end, table 1 provides a brief and stylized comparison of key
dimensions along which the 10 and strategy perspectives differ."6
Table 1
Stylized Comparison of Strategy and IO Economics Perspectives
Strategy 10 Economics
Primary level of analysis Firm Industry
Firm ability to change Constrained Relatively unconstrained
Firm decision making Boundedly rational Rational and with
and relatively myopic foresight
Firm similarity within Heterogeneous Relatively homogenous
industry
A key source of differences between the strategy field and 10 is
that strategy focuses on complex and often system-level differences
among firms, whereas IO focuses on market outcomes in which firms
differ in limited ways (such as that all firms have access to the same
production function, but firm-specific costs reflect units sold, produc-
tion capacities, or access to intellectual property). Because explaining
sustainable profits resulting from strategy also entails understanding
the system of interactions that constitute a firm, strategy embraces
more complex and less-well-defined problems than 10 has tradition-
ally addressed.
In addition to the different level of analysis, IO's more "black box"
view of the firm leads IO scholars to view the firms as more similar
than different, more malleable, and more characterized by making
optimizing decisions. Essentially, behavioral constraints on firm action
as well as the path dependence associated with each firm's history,
both of which many strategy schools deem critical to understanding
firm performance, are relatively suppressed in the conventional 10
16 See also Richard P. Rumelt, Dan Schendel & David J. Teece, Strategic
Management and Economics, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 5-6 (1991); Felix Ober-
holzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, Market Imperfections and Sustainable Competitive
Advantage, in OXFORD HANDBOOK IN MANAGERIAL ECONoMICs 262-77 (Christo-
pher R. Thomas & William F. Shughart II eds., 2013).
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view of the firm. 10 economists recognize, of course, that firms can
and do differ, but they believe that questions regarding market struc-
ture as well as firm performance can be answered satisfactorily using
simplifying assumptions regarding firm heterogeneity." Moreover, IO
scholars also argue that firms in more mature markets make relatively
rational and optimizing decisions, because firms that do not act this
way would be driven out of the market by those that do."
B. Understanding the significance of the strategy and
10 relationship for antitrust
Because IO is already established as the primary social science
foundation for antitrust law, strategy's contributions to antitrust are
usefully understood in terms of their additions or modifications to the
existing 10 foundation. Section II.A provided background for this
assessment by examining the general differences between the strategy
and 10 fields as well as some specific differences among the strategy
schools. As discussed, the strategy field can provide the antitrust
community with insights regarding-the mechanisms through which
firms make decisions, create competitive advantage, and achieve
superior performance. While such insights do not directly illuminate
market performance, they are often critical to predicting which forces
will affect market performance and for explaining or evaluating
firms' past actions.
Strategy's additional contributions to antitrust, relative to those of
10, can be usefully understood with reference to the degree of com-
1 Strategy scholars argue that the documented, wide variations between
firms' performances within an industry underscores the inadequacy of using
industry characteristics as the primary bases for understanding firm conduct
and performance. See Richard P. Rumelt, How Much Does Industry Matter? 12
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 167 (1991), and Anita McGahan & Michael E. Porter, How
Much Does Industry Matter, Really?, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 15 (1997), for a
debate regarding how much of the variability of profits across firms in the
economy is attributable to differences among firm characteristics versus dif-
ferences among industry characteristics.
18 There is some irony in this argument, at least with regard to antitrust,
as the subjects of interest will often not face the full force of competition in
their markets and, hence, may not need to optimize to survive.
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patibility between the two fields. Strategy insights that reinforce the
IO paradigm are at one pole, while insights that directly challenge the
10 paradigm occupy the other pole. Between those two extremes are
more nuanced relationships between the fields. For example, strategy
teachings may differ from IO and yet be largely complementary. This
would occur if strategy incorporates factors that 10 does not recog-
nize but whose treatment does not preclude factors that 10 favors.
The contributions of economics-based schools of strategy, unsurpris-
ingly, tend to be most compatible with 10. In fact, many key strategy con-
cepts such as Porter's five forces framework developed as applications of
10 to strategy questions." Other ideas, such as viewing the firm as a
value chain composed of various interacting activities, provide a distinct
perspective on firm choice and performance that still remains largely
consistent with 10 principles.20 The value of these concepts is that they
provide antitrust with frameworks, distinct from those IO provides, to
understand firm choices that reflect, for example, the complexities of
production activity systems or formal and informal organizational
relationships. Even when strategy frameworks are relatively open-
ended, and therefore less useful for prediction of firm decisions or
market outcomes, the frameworks still contribute useful organizing
principles for evaluating business documents and testimony.21
The theories and evidence associated with the more behaviorally
oriented strategy schools tend to be less compatible with the IO para-
digm than those of the more economics-oriented schools. The behav-
iorally-oriented approaches reflect the additional perspectives of
sociology, psychology, and sometimes political science. Such analyses
often directly question and critique key 10 assumptions. In turn, these
strategy analyses have been criticized when they do not offer viable
alternatives for policy. It is, for example, much easier to establish that
firm decision making in practice substantially diverges from the
1 Porter, How Competitive Forces, supra note 7.
20 PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 7.
21 Most frameworks in both strategy and 10 assume that the firm is
guided by a coherent strategy. But see Henry Mintzberg & James A. Waters, Of
Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent, 6 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 257 (1985) (observing
that many firms lack a deliberate strategy).
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global optimization assumed in many economic theories, than it is to
provide a defensible alternative decision-making model. In the short
run, such failings may slow the diffusion of knowledge from the
behaviorally based strategy schools to antitrust. However, the cri-
tiques and empirical observations these perspectives introduce offer
the potential for improved antitrust discourse and may provide an
impetus to reject or otherwise limit the application of weaker antitrust
ideas with limited or disputed empirical bases.22
In the longer term, the gap between the contributions to antitrust
law produced by 10 and strategy fields collectively and those pro-
duced by 10 alone depends on what research questions are posed and
whether the answers to those questions differ. It was noted previously
that IO and strategy generally address different questions. But in this
specific setting, 10's attention to antitrust problems may have steered
some 10 researchers toward questions that are more firm-specific and,
therefore, more strategy-like.' Historically, at least, even when the
questions were the same, the answers sometimes differed owing to
the two fields' differing perspectives.24 This is particularly true with
regard to strategy's more behavioral contributions.
Other factors that render distinctive the contributions of strategy
and 10 to antitrust involve the two fields' differing restrictions and
2 Well-accepted theories influence antitrust decisions even when the
evidence is lacking to support their specific application to the firms and mar-
ket in question. Their deployment under such circumstances reflects the abid-
ing assumption that the conditions under which those theories operate are
present, if not observable. Strategy scholarship with its attention to firm-spe-
cific differences is valuable in helping to understand the boundary conditions
of various economic (and strategy) theories.
23 In the extreme, this view would suggest that in an effort to address all
relevant issues posed by antitrust, 10 would engage relevant questions that
would normally be in the strategy domain. Not withstanding the difficulties
10 would have addressing behaviorally oriented forces, in our opinion such
an extreme conclusion reflects an unduly optimistic view regarding how a
field with an established paradigm develops knowledge.
24 It is important to remember that the IO and strategy fields are not
fully distinct as many strategy field researchers are trained as 10 economists
and, as has been discussed, the origins of some of the schools of strategy can
be traced to 10.
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quality standards regarding theory building and empirical research.
The development of theories regarding system-level organizational
phenomena, for example, is severely hampered by analytical tractabil-
ity concerns. Strategy's greater emphasis on answering questions
regarding matters of design and implementation leads the field to
adopt methods that economics relatively disfavors, such as computer
simulation models involving somewhat myopic firms, and to be more
permissive regarding analytical examples relative to more general theo-
retical analyses. Additionally, strategy has been arguably more accom-
modating to empirical studies that suggest important patterns and
relationships for which a well-articulated theory may still be lacking.
Given its focus on particular firm performance as well as its desire
to capture complex organizational phenomena, strategy scholarship
rewards organizational case studies involving extended observation
and interviews.' This approach is relatively disfavored by 10 and,
moreover, the vast majority of economists lack the requisite training
to engage in such research.26 The strategy field's relative openness
regarding methods means that strategy scholars undertake analyses
that their economics colleagues tend to discount or even ignore.
Hence, to the extent that the antitrust community's reliance on 10 lim-
its either antitrust's questions posed or its search for answers,
antitrust may miss potentially relevant answers that exist or could be
developed in the strategy field.
In summary, the theoretical virtues and the practical success asso-
ciated with the use of IO to understand market level effects has led 10
to be the dominant social science paradigm in antitrust law. As the
dominant paradigm, IO has also been deployed to interpret and pre-
dict individual firm conduct which is the domain of the strategy field.
Despite considerable overlap between the fields, the strategy field
provides a distinct set of perspectives, theories, and empirical knowl-
edge that reinforces, complements, and sometimes challenges antitrust
25 See, e.g., Jason P. Davis & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Rotating Leadership
and Collaborative Innovation: Recombination Processes in Symbiotic Relationships,
56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 159 (2011).
26 Many economic historians (for example, those studying medieval
guild practices) engage in case studies, but they may not need to develop
refined interview and observation techniques.
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positions based on IO. Section III examines, within the merger con-
text, several specific examples of distinct contributions the strategy
field offers.
III. THE VALUE OF STRATEGY TO ANTITRUST:
THE CASE OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS
Section III examines the value of strategy for antitrust merger
review. Regardless of the specific dimension of the merger at issue,
taken collectively, the six analyses that follow underscore how the
role that strategy does or can play in merger analysis must be under-
stood, whether explicitly or implicitly, with reference to 10. The Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines (Guidelines), jointly revised and reissued
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Jus-
tice's Antitrust Division (DOJ) (together, the Agencies) in 2010, consti-
tute a key point of reference within this discussion.27 This reliance
reflects several factors. The vast majority of merger review activity
occurs at the Agency level and the Guidelines constitute the Agencies'
statement of enforcement policy. Moreover, in addition to codifying
current Agency thinking regarding merger review, the horizontal
merger guidelines, in their various permutations through the decades,
have emerged as a highly regarded distillation of existing legal prece-
dent as well as the frequently powerful (though technically nonbind-
ing) influence on judicial rulings.28
A. Antitrust merger law
American antitrust law is largely codified in three statutes. The Sher-
man Act's sections 1 and 2 address concerted (such as price fixing) and
unilateral activity (such as monopolization), respectively.29 The FTC Act
establishes the FTC as an independent competition agency that shares
civil enforcement authority with DOJ under the Sherman and Clayton
27 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/sites/default
/files / attachments / merger-review /100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
W Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guide-
lines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 828-83 (2006) (dis-
cussing broader trends in merger guideline influence).
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004).
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Acts, but the FTC is also empowered to prosecute "unfair methods of
competition."' Most importantly, for instant purposes, is Clayton Act
section 7 (as amended by the Cellar-Kefauver Act in 1950), which pro-
scribes mergers wherein "the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
The enforcement of section 7 has involved several challenges. As
with the other seminal antitrust statutes, section 7 includes many con-
cepts that the legislature did not define and that were not amenable to
easy interpretation." Despite the ambiguity characterizing the
statute's terms, one aspect that was clear was that proposed mergers
B. Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The Guidelines describe two general theories for analyzing a
merger's competitive effects. Coordinated effects theory examines
whether a merger increases the likelihood that firms in the industry
will coordinate their actions, for example by tacitly or implicitly coor-
dinating prices." Unilateral effects theory examines whether the
merged firm alone can profitably raise prices (or profitably engage in
other actions that have anticompetitive consequences) post-merger.M
Antitrust merger analysis depends primarily on predictions
regarding firm conduct and its consequences as opposed to assess-
ments of prior activity. These predictions can be more accurate if the
Agencies understand, from the perspective of the relevant firms, how
the firms perceive their choices. Such an understanding can be guided
and enhanced with the help of strategy and other business fields."
3 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996).
32 William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 470 (2003) ("In the field of economic
regulation, the antitrust laws of the United States are unique in their generality.").
33 GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 1.
34 Id.
3 COLLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 5, provide a strategic management
framework on considerations that firms contemplating a merger should ana-
lyze. Their view integrates both economic logic and a more firm-specific
resource and activity system view of firm choice.
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The following discussion examines six important aspects of
merger analysis to illustrate the strategy field's capacity to contribute
to antitrust law and policy. As discussed previously, strategy field
contributions can be loosely ordered in terms of their compatibility
with the 10 paradigm. At one end of the spectrum are strategy teach-
ings that are essentially applications of 10 to strategy and at the other
end are strategy teachings that reject IO assumptions. Examples in the
middle include independent contributions of strategy that are clearly
distinct from, but not necessarily incompatible with, those of 10.
1. POWER BUYERS-The Guidelines designate "powerful" buyers by
their ability to "often ... negotiate favorable terms with their suppliers."'
As such, the presence of "powerful buyers" is a factor that could
potentially mitigate a merged entity's ability to raise prices, though it is
not presumed to forestall a merger's otherwise adverse competitive
effects." The Guidelines specifically contemplate circumstances that
reflect this countervailing power dynamic, such as "if powerful buyers
have the ability and incentive to vertically integrate upstream or sponsor
entry, or if the conduct or presence of large buyers undermines
coordinated effects . . . ."' As such, the Guidelines identify the need to
"examine the choices available to powerful buyers and how those
choices likely would change due to the merger."39
Within the merger context, the evaluation of power buyers
requires general assessments regarding buyer power within the rele-
vant market, as well as more specific determinations regarding indi-
vidual buyers. 10 provides valuable theory and empirical tools that
help in this assessment. Economics-based mechanisms facilitate
understanding the relative bargaining power between suppliers and
buyers, including whether a power buyer's influence would likely
affect the terms other buyers receive.
Strategy's contribution to power buyer analyses primarily comple-
ments 10, and it is particularly valuable when more complex, systemic
3 GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 8.
3 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id.
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understandings are needed. Consider, for example, the cost to a buyer
if it switches suppliers. These switching costs may constitute an
important factor determining a buyer's leverage over a seller. Strat-
egy's potential contributions result from its more comprehensive and
firm-specific approach. Switching costs are assessed by examining fac-
tors including past switching behavior, the role of formal contracts and
informal relationships, the characteristics of the product or service at
issue, and information and transaction costs affecting the exchange.
A strategy-based assessment of a buyer's switching costs would
typically reflect the buying firm's overall business strategy and the
economic and social relationship between the buyer and its suppliers.
For example, with regard to the overall business strategy, the impor-
tance of a supplier's product depends on how the buyer creates value
for customers. As such, whether a buyer actually has leverage over
suppliers may largely depend on the buyer's business strategy. A
buyer whose competitive advantage is based on lower costs might
incur quite different switching costs than a buyer whose advantage
derives from superior quality. Moreover, without reference to how the
firm is investing in its strategy, it may be difficult to determine
switching costs based on historical data alone.
Buyer-supplier relationships are more complex if, for example,
critical purchases reflect some degree of joint development or other
type of interdependence. An assessment of switching costs and their
implications for buyer power is likely to benefit from an in-depth
understanding of such relationships. Strategy and 10 will likely offer
different perspectives on such relationships because the strategy field,
through the influence of organizational behavior, is more likely than
IO to examine the social, as well as the economic, aspects of these
relationships.
To be sure, the evidentiary record for certain mergers may well
contain information that would direct astute analysts to consider the
connections between business strategy and switching costs and to the
potential importance of social factors in buyer-seller relationships.
Nonetheless, when the buyer-supplier interaction under scrutiny is
complex, an awareness and integration of the teachings of the strat-
egy field offer additional useful structure for examining and assessing
switching costs and, hence, for making power buyer determinations.
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2. MAVERICK FIMS-The Guidelines explicitly recognize that a firm's
competitive effects may be greater than traditional measures, such as
market share, nominally suggest. Such firms are deemed "mavericks" if
they "play[] a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of customers.""
A maverick firm usually has one or more important characteristics (such
as its technology or business model) that lead the firm to act more
competitively than the other firms in the market. 41 The Agencies,
therefore, "consider whether a merger may lessen competition by
eliminating a 'maverick' firm."42 Mergers involving mavericks are
deemed relatively more problematic than those not involving mavericks.
Whether, or to what extent, a firm's activities are competitively
disruptive within a given marketplace constitutes the type of market-
based analysis for which 10 is well-suited. In addition to such market-
level assessments, IO-based analysis would rely heavily on assessing
historic firm behavior as part of any inquiry regarding mavericks. Ide-
ally, these historical observations will be interpreted in light of the
firm's underlying business rationale. This point was made by Profes-
sor Leslie Marx, a business school economist, who testified during
joint FTC/DOJ hearings that "[tihe [Gluidelines seem to view a firm's
status as a maverick as some exogenously given and unchangeable
characteristic of a firm. But so-called maverick behavior is a strategic
decision of a firm, not an exogenous characteristic. The [Gluidelines
are written as if a maverick's behavior is that of a wild animal."
40 Id. § 2.1.5.
41 Id.
42 Id. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion:
Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 135 (2002) (comprehensively analyzing the increasing attention to the
role of mavericks within the merger context).
4 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project, Dec. 3,
2009 Workshop, at 90, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/ public-events / horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project
/091203transcript.pdf. Former FTC Bureau of Economics Director David Scheff-
man specifically invokes the differing perspectives of strategy and economics
regarding mavericks. FTC/DOJ Merger Workshop, Feb. 18, 2004, at 163-64,
available at http: / / www.justice.gov / atr/ public / workshops / docs / 203842.pdf
("I have big arguments with hard core economists who think this maverick stuff
is b.s. 1, as a strategy professor, say firms choose their competitive strategies.").
806 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 59, No. 4/Winter 2014
Strategy-based analysis, with its emphasis on understanding dif-
ferences among firms and its in-depth analysis of actual firm strate-
gies, would also rely heavily upon past firm behavior. But it is
arguably better suited than 10 to more fully plumb the significance of
that history and to transcend the role of history within the broader
competitive analysis, thereby allowing for better predictions when
industry conditions change. This difference reflects, in part, IO's ten-
dency to consider firms as more similar than different. Strategy's con-
ceptual frameworks and research methods offer a more direct route,
compared with 10, for assessing the presence and execution of a mav-
erick-oriented strategy. A strategy-oriented analysis would be less
reliant on evidence regarding prior conduct if, for example, the poten-
tial disruptive action was consistent with firm positioning and efforts
to create and exploit its competitive advantages. Furthermore, with
the type of strategy and resources identified, it is easier to connect the
specific circumstances at issue to examples outside the focal market.
3. ENTRY-According to the Guidelines, a merger will not be
deemed anticompetitive "if entry into the market is so easy" that market
participants, either unilaterally or collectively, cannot "profitably raise
price or otherwise reduce competition" compared to the premerger
levels." Such "easy entry" is that which would be "timely, likely, and
sufficient . . . to deter or counteract the competitive effects of con-
cern."" An important part of assessing entry is the availability of
required assets. When such assets are not generally available, entry
analysis typically focuses on particular firms." In addition to histori-
cal evidence regarding entry, whether successful or unsuccessful, the
Guidelines provide a list of elements characterizing potential barriers
to entry and entry efforts that the Agencies will consider.4 7
4 GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 9 (emphasis added). "[Product rieposition-
ing is a supply-side response that is evaluated much like entry ..... Id. § 9.
4 Id. § 9.3.
46 Id. § 9.
47 These elements include: "planning, design, and management; permit-
ting, licensing, or other approvals; construction, debugging, and operation of
production facilities; and promotion (including necessary introductory dis-
counts), marketing, distribution, and satisfaction of customer testing and
qualification requirements." Id.
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An 10-based entry analysis focuses on the increased incentives for
entry given changes in market conditions (especially anticipated price
or quality changes) associated with a given merger.
The strategy field's contributions to entry analysis derive from its
insights regarding such decisions within the context of firms' broader
business and corporate plans. For firms specifically identified as nom-
inally plausible entry candidates, it may be possible to better assess
the likelihood of entry by determining whether it makes sense given
the specific firm's overall strategy. Strategy-oriented questions
include: Is entry the best use of the firm's resources? Does the firm
possess or will it be able to develop and sustain competitive advan-
tage in this market? Entry is less likely if a firm's strategy entails the
use and development of particular joint resources or the development
of core capabilities to which this entry would not contribute or, per-
haps, from which this entry would affirmatively detract. The converse
would also be true. The strategy field offers numerous frameworks,
including those regarding corporate strategy and diversification,
which would help illuminate the entry issues with which merger law
grapples.' Strategy-oriented considerations are, of course, not unique
to a strategy field-based analysis, but most analysts trained only in 10
are likely to be relatively unfamiliar with them.
4. MARKET DEFINITION AND DEMAND ESTIMATION-Market definition
focuses upon "demand substitution factors" so as to "help[] specify"
the product and geographic markets in which competitive issues may
arise.' More specifically, it examines "customers' ability and willing-
ness to substitute" the merging firms' products with those of other
firms. Ideally, the relevant product and geographic markets will be
defined to include "reasonably interchangeable" substitutes with
regard to "product attributes and perceptions" and geographic loca-
tion, respectively." Such definitions better enable the Agencies to
identify market participants, and by implication market shares and
4 A resource-based view of diversification would, for example, analyze
whether entry makes sense given the joint resources developed and used
across a firm's entire portfolio of businesses. See COLLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra
note 5.
4 GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 4.
5 Id.
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concentration, which often helps illuminate a merger's "likely com-
petitive effects."" The Guidelines do not require that Agency analysis
begin with market definition and they specifically indicate that cer-
tain of their analytical tools "do not rely on market definition."52
Nonetheless, they state that the "evaluation of competitive alterna-
tives available to customers is always necessary at some point in the
analysis." 3
10 and other fields within economics have developed many theo-
ries and methods to facilitate characterizing and measuring market
demand. With limited exceptions, these approaches treat consumer
preferences as fixed. In contrast to these economic fields, business
fields such as marketing treat consumer preferences as more mal-
leable and their choices as more subject to cognitive biases and the
use of heuristics. The divergence in assumptions regarding consumer
preferences and choices likely reflects factors including the strong dis-
ciplinary influence of psychology on the business fields and perhaps
the business problems encountered in practice (such as creating effec-
tive advertising programs). Consequently, marketing scholarship
offers many distinctive theories and methods that are not closely
related to those of I0. 54
Differences between marketing and IO perspectives on consumer
preferences and choice may manifest themselves in both assessments
of qualitative evidence and in econometric measurements of
demand. With respect to qualitative evidence, one practical conse-
quence of this difference is that the relative willingness to credit the
testimony of industry experts may depend upon the experts' treat-
ment of consumer preferences. In terms of measurement, marketing
scholarship suggests it would be important for antitrust analysis to
understand the conditions under which endogenous preferences and
cognitive biases are first-order as opposed to second-order considera-
51 Id.
52 Id.
5 Id.
5 While the behavioral economics subfield imports and develops psy-
chology-based insights, this subfield's teachings have not yet been substan-
tially integrated into 10.
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tions.5 Of particular interest would be an exploration of how allowing
for endogenous preferences and cognitive biases change the predic-
tions of econometric models used to estimate the competitive effects
of mergers.
Teachings from the strategy field, though less directly applicable
than marketing to consumer demand applications, help inform
antitrust analysis in contexts where the buyers are firms. For example,
firm strategies may be quite informative regarding substitution pat-
terns and perhaps even short-to-medium term changes in preferences
due to modifications in a buyer's strategy given changes to its down-
stream output market.
5. EFFICIENCIES-The Guidelines recognize that "a primary benefit
of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant
efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive
to compete . . . ."'6 For the FTC and DOJ to "credit" an efficiency-
based defense, the efficiencies must be "cognizable" in that they are
merger-specific, verifiable, and do not reflect "anticompetitive reduc-
tions in output or service ."51 This requires that the claimed efficien-
cies are likely to be achieved with the proposed merger, or a
comparably anticompetitive means, and that they are unlikely to be
achieved otherwise. The Agencies consider alternatives that are
"practical," not those that are merely "theoretical," in their assess-
ments." The merging parties, who possess the information most rele-
vant to efficiency claims, must substantiate their efficiency claims
notwithstanding the fact that they are oftentimes "difficult to verify
and quantify.""
5 Marketing and economics literature addressing consumer preference
learning models includes, respectively, Gregory S. Carpenter & Kent
Nakamoto, Consumer Preference Formation and Pioneering Advantage, 26 J. MAR-
KETING REs. 285 (1989), and Michael J. Dickstein, Efficient Provision of Experi-
ence Goods: Evidence from Antidepressant Choice (Stanford University Working
Paper, Apr. 2014).
5 GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 10.
5 Id.
58 Id.
9 Id.
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IO provides many tools that facilitate the assessment of efficiency
claims, particularly those claims involving measurable production
cost efficiencies (such as scale and scope efficiencies), network
economies, savings from adopting the superior method of one of the
merging parties, and savings from eliminating duplication of func-
tions. Many of these economies, especially those relating to produc-
tion, can be estimated using engineering cost estimates.
An important window into Agency treatment of efficiencies, specif-
ically at the FTC, is provided by a staff report from the FTC's Bureau of
Economics. Authors Malcolm B. Coate and Andrew J. Heimert usefully
characterize the efforts and conclusions arrived at by the FTC's staff
within the Bureau of Economics and Bureau of Competition from 1997
to 2007 regarding alleged merger efficiencies. This report concluded
that both staffs "did a thorough job of acknowledging and considering
the parties' efficiency claims."" Significantly, the report also concluded
that during the decade in question "little appears to have changed with
the types of the parties' efficiency claims or the staff's treatment of
them" and that "both [the Bureau of Competition] and [the Bureau of
Economics] ... did not make conclusive recommendations concerning
a majority of efficiency claims they considered."'
Two characteristics that decrease the reliability associated with
efficiency claims are that many such claims depend on proposed
investment plans being undertaken post-merger and that the organi-
zational costs associated with merger integration are frequently
underestimated by the merging parties and difficult to quantify.6 2 Fur-
thermore, estimates regarding the existence and feasibility of less
restrictive alternatives may be incomplete. These concerns may par-
6 Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the
Federal Trade Commission 1997-2007, at vi (FTC Bureau of Economics Report,
Feb. 2007) available at http: / / www.ftc.gov / sites / default / files / documents
/ reports / merger-efficiencies-federal-trade-commission-1997-2007 / 0902
mergerefficiencies.pdf.
61 Id.
62 Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO
Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. OF FINANCIAL EcoNoMICs 20
(2008), for example, find evidence supporting that overpayment for acquisi-
tions is caused by CEO overconfidence.
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tially explain the conservative manner with which antitrust law treats
merger efficiency claims.
Strategy research offers some promising directions to address
these problems. The strategy literature provides deeper knowledge
regarding firm-specific factors identified in 10-based efficiencies eval-
uations as well as a means to understand factors that are either under-
appreciated or less well-understood by 10.63 For example, strategy
provides a system-level understanding regarding how different activ-
ities within the firm reinforce each other and impact competitive
advantage. More concretely, strategy often provides a superior basis,
relative to 10, for evaluating somewhat imprecise managerial state-
ments regarding a merger's purpose and the likely path of the
merged firm's investment and strategy development.
Integration costs and implementation feasibility issues are critical to
understanding organizational change, a central research concern of the
organizational behavior and strategy fields. Work in this area can high-
light where the largest opportunities and challenges would lie with
respect to aligning and integrating the acquired firm and, therefore,
would assist in understanding the "cost" side of the net efficiencies esti-
mation.' If developed within the context of merger review, such insights
would allow for a more nuanced view of efficiencies which might, in
turn, lead to more refined treatment of this critical aspect of mergers."
6 See Malcolm B. Coate, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An Institution-
alist View, 13 Sup. CT. EcoN. REV. 189 (2005) (advocating incorporation of
"institutionally-based business strategy analysis to both evaluate efficien-
cies and competitive concerns").
6 One example that highlights the difficulties in integration is the
knowledge problem that firms experience when trying to transfer best prac-
tices from one of their plants to another. See, e.g., Szulanski, supra note 13.
65 Given that the strategy literature's frameworks and evidence offer
particular value to antitrust assessments concerning individual firms, strategy-
can help inform understandings regarding remedial measures including, for
example, divestitures. The practical consequences of proposed divestitures
often turn upon the extent to which the acquiring firm's strategy will support
the meaningful integration and exploitation of the firm or assets at issue. This
information forces a consideration of the totality of forces affecting likely
buyer firm decisions, which can be critical for transcending the possibilities
suggested by economic analysis, especially when existing business docu-
ments and managerial opinions are contradictory and confusing.
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Finally, the merger-specificity requirement regarding efficiencies
often entails an examination of alternatives to the proposed merger to
achieve the efficiencies. Such assessments inevitably entail some degree
of judicial or Agency second-guessing of firms." Basic IO analysis is help-
ful here, but so too is a strategy analysis. Assessing alternative
approaches requires determining whether the merging parties have the
capabilities to reasonably undertake the alternative, whether the alterna-
tive fits into the overall strategy of the firm, and whether various imple-
mentation obstacles would or did prevent the proposed alternative from
being adopted. Answers to these questions fall within strategy's domain.
6. INNOVATION-Consumer welfare, as defined in the Guidelines,
concerns not only static considerations of price and quantity but also the
dynamic consideration of innovation. Because "[clompetition often
spurs firms to innovate," it is important to "consider whether a merger
is likely to diminish innovation competition... ."67 Curtailed innovation
could manifest itself through reduced incentives to initiate new product
development or to continue existing product-development efforts.6
While the significance, at least in theory of innovation considerations
within merger analysis is longstanding, its actual treatment remains
challenging particularly within technologically dynamic markets.'
" See, e.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998). The
district court found that the FTC's evidence "strongly suggests" that "much"
of alleged merger-related savings could be obtained without merging through
"improved purchasing practices and inventory reductions on their own by
adopting better business strategies." Id. at 63. The court ultimately ruled that
the claimed procompetitive efficiencies did not outweigh the likely anticom-
petitive effects associated with the merger. See also Coate & Heimert, supra
note 60, at 24 (noting that the Bureau of Economics staff's first and second
most common questions regarding efficiency claims concerned their verifia-
bility and merger specificity, respectively).
67 GUIDELINES, supra note 27, § 6.4.
66 Id.
69 Id. See also Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Innovation Issues Under
the 1992 Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J 506 (1993). In the mid-1990s the
Agencies sought to define "innovation" markets as a way to assess the inno-
vation effects of mergers. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C.
Sunshine,Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use
of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 601 (1995); Ilene Knable Gotts &
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One significant obstacle to 10 as a vehicle to more meaningfully
incorporate dynamic efficiency considerations into merger analysis is
the field's incomplete understanding of the sources of innovation.
Economists, for example, disagree about what market structure
induces the most innovation and even what constitutes the optimal
level of innovation.' Work in the field involves topics such as innova-
tion incentives, knowledge spillovers, and the impact of property
rights. There is less work on innovation processes themselves.
The strategy, marketing, and operations management fields also
have an incomplete understanding of innovation. However, their
approaches to understanding the innovation process and innovation
strategy differ significantly different from those of 10. This reflects, in
part, their focus on processes within individual firms and firm-level
decision making, as well as these fields' relative openness to noneco-
nomic approaches, including those of sociology, psychology, organiza-
tional studies, and the history of science and technology. Because the
business fields tend to be multidisciplinary, they offer perspectives that
IO arguably underappreciates, such as viewing firm knowledge about
innovation as relevant capabilities embodied in organizational routines.
As an example of such approaches' potential value, consider the
application of the strategy field's resources and capabilities frame-
Richard T. Rapp, Antitrust Treatment of Mergers Involving Future Goods,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 100, 102. The difficulties associated with this approach
generally limited its use to very specific settings such as the pharmaceutical
drug industry where regulatory constraints make predictions of future drug
markets quite reliable. See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Non-Per Se Treatment of Buyer
Price-Fixing in Intellectual Property Settings, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 4, 9
61-62.
70 Former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris and co-author Bilal Sayyed
argued against inclusion of any reference to "innovation markets" within the
merger guidelines given the paucity of understanding and the narrowness of
Agency experience regarding their operation. They were equally wary of the
inclusion of a section on innovation more generally. See Timothy J. Muris &
Bilal Sayyed, Three Key Principles for Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
ANTITRUST SouRCE, Apr. 2010, at 12, and id. at 13 (("Theoretical and empirical
work in economics has not found a conclusive relationship between concentra-
tion levels and the pace or amount of innovation."). See also Richard Gilbert, Look-
ing for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6
INNovAnoN PoucY AND THE EcoNoMY 159, 205-06 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2006).
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work to merger analysis when innovation competition is at issue."
Could the competitive consequences of a merger between firms with
overlapping innovation capabilities be better predicted by consider-
ing firm capabilities rather than by assessing market competition in
current markets? 7 2 Stated alternatively, rather than focusing on
whether specific innovations may arise post-merger, would more use-
ful predictions result from analyses that focused on the processes that
produce that innovation and which, if any, firms possess key capabili-
ties for innovation in particular areas?
Strategy teaches that firms are likely to be more effective (future)
competitors if they possess the resources and capabilities needed to
serve the projected future market. While intuitively appealing, the
value of a capabilities approach within the merger context would
need to be established empirically. Studies could, for example, explore
the relationship between various types of capabilities and innovation
in identifiable areas (and an absence of innovation in those areas by
firms who do not possess these capabilities) as well as boundary con-
ditions for the application of this approach.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF THE STRATEGY FIELD ON
ANTITRUST: AN UPDATE
Section III explored the strategy field's distinctive ability to con-
tribute to antitrust law and policy within the merger context. Though
framed within the context of Agency application of the Guidelines,
the discussion underscored the value of strategy-based concepts, as
well as concepts drawn from other business fields, to enhance
antitrust decision making more generally. Over time, numerous com-
mentators have also advocated antitrust's greater reliance upon vari-
ous business fields. Despite their varied approaches and positions,
collectively understood these commentators suggest that antitrust
law inadequately accounts for business fields including strategy.73
71 See, for example, DAVID J. TEEcE, DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES & STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZING FOR INNOVATION AND GROWTH 48 (2009), for a dis-
cussion of capabilities useful for innovation.
72 Yao & DeSanti, supra note 70, at 511.
7 See supra note 2. A number of symposia (American Antitrust Institute
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In 2010, strategy professors Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Dennis A.
Yao sought to more systematically, albeit imperfectly, assess strategy's
influence on antitrust through a first-order citation analysis of judicial
rulings and legal scholarship from 1999-2008." Briefly restated, Ober-
holzer-Gee and Yao first identified a small group of prominent schol-
ars, top journals, and core concepts in each of the strategy and 10
fields." These scholars, journals, and concepts were used as the "tar-
gets" of potential citations. The "sources" of the citations were all fed-
eral and state antitrust cases and law reviews on antitrust law
indexed by the LexisNexis Academic database. The citation counts
were the number of sources that reference the identified citation tar-
gets. On the basis of these counts, Oberholzer-Gee and Yao concluded
that "strategy has had a minimal effect on thinking in antitrust."'
Section IV extends that analysis through 2013, provides citation rates
calculated by dividing the absolute number of citations by the total num-
ber of potential sources of citations,' and offers some additional informa-
tion regarding merger cases and the influence of the marketing field.'
The updated analysis reinforces the overall conclusion Oberholzer-Gee
and Yao reached five years ago. As measured by citation counts, the strat-
egy field's influence on antitrust law and scholarship appears small in
2002, 2013) and panels (ABA Antitrust Section magazine 1998 and 2006; ABA
spring meetings; FTC and DOJ hearings) have addressed this general issue.
74 Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 2.
7 Id. The citation approach was also applied in William E. Kovacic, The
Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 294 (1992) to assess
the influence of economics on antitrust law.
76 Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 2, at 1475.
7 The percentage of unique cases or law reviews that mention a key
term is smaller than that reported, as many cases and law reviews mention
multiple key terms.
78 The current analysis differs somewhat from the Oberholzer-Gee & Yao
analysis, supra note 2, because the instant analysis used WestLaw (as of May
2014) and focused solely upon federal cases. One of the issues associated with
determining relevant citations is whether the case or article has a substantial
antitrust component. Here we designate an article as an antitrust article if
"antitrust" is mentioned ten or more times. This threshold was chosen after
an examination of the articles that would have been included or excluded if a
lower or higher number of mentions, respectively, had been adopted.
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absolute terms and dwarfed relative to 10. The most recent five-year
period is largely consistent with the preceding years with one exception:
The increase in citation of strategy concepts is substantially higher in the
2009-13 period. This count could reflect strategy's increasing influence,
but a more in-depth study is required before drawing any conclusions.'
A specific analysis of federal merger cases reveals a pattern of cita-
tions similar to that in the antitrust case analysis but with a generally
higher citation rate.' Given that the number of citations in merger cases
is quite modest, one cannot draw any strong merger-specific conclu-
sions based on these statistics. A citation analysis was also undertaken
to examine the influence of the marketing field on antitrust law, and
thereby provide a reference point against which to gauge whether the
strategy field was an outlier in terms of business field influence on
antitrust. The analysis used marketing scholars and marketing journals
as citation targets and produced measures of citations that, relative to
strategy, were smaller in terms of citations to marketing scholars but
roughly similar in terms of citations to marketing journals." This evi-
7 A closer look at the data shows that this increase is largely composed
of references to "disruptive technology" and "value chain." The increase in
references to disruptive technology is mirrored by an increase in citations to
Clayton Christensen, who pioneered the disruptive technology concept. CLAY-
TON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA (1997). Because "hot" concepts
change over time, it is unclear if this increase reflects a greater openness to
strategy generally or merely reflects a particular idea that has gained traction.
While this increase is somewhat encouraging, the preliminary assessment
regarding the influence of other foundational concepts in strategy is mixed.
8 There are no citations between 1999 and 2013 to our target strategy schol-
ars and journals and only two citations to the targeted strategy concepts. From
1999 to 2003 there were 2 citations of the targeted economics scholars, 2 for the
targeted economics journals, and 5 for the targeted economics concepts. The com-
parable numbers were 2 (scholars), 2 (journals), 3 (concepts) and then 0, 0, 7, for
2004-08 and 2009-13, respectively. Because the baseline numbers of merger cases
were 102, 76, and 67, for the periods 1999-2003, 2004-08, and 2009-13, respec-
tively, the percentage of citations was considerably higher for mergers than
within other antitrust contexts. This result is unsurprising given that merger
analysis can involve extensive and broad-ranging economic analysis.
81 An analysis of citations to a selected list of ten distinguished marketing
scholars (based on awards for marketing scholarship) and four marketing jour-
nals (Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Market-
ing, and Marketing Science) was also undertaken. The ten distinguished scholars
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dence arguably suggests that the strategy counts are probably represen-
tative of the general level of influence of business fields on antitrust.
As measures of influence, both the absolute numbers of citations
and the citation rates reported in tables 2 and 3 have many limita-
tions, and therefore should be interpreted as merely suggestive. The
most important limitation is that the citation count is based on a small
selection of targets. A small absolute number of citations increases the
possibility that the targets are unrepresentative of their respective
Table 2
Target Citations in Federal Court Rulings (1999-2013)
1999-2003
Citation # Citation %
2004-08
Citation # Citation %
2009-13
Citation # Citation %
Strategy
Scholar 0
Journal 0
Concept 3
10 Economics
Scholar I
Journal 6
Concept 3
Table 3
Target Citations in Law Reviews (1999-2013)
1999-2003 2004-08
Citation # Citation % Citation # Citation %
Strategy
Scholar
Journal 5
Concept 5
10 Economics
Scholar 5
Journal
Concept 5
63
54
53
3.2
2.7
2.7
25.8
31.3
28.0
514
23
558
56
41
45
437
633
565
2.4
1.8
2.0
18.9
27.4
24.5
2009-13
Citation # Citation %
73
67
109
472
737
613
2.8
2.6
4.3
18.4
28.7
23.9
0
0
0.3
1.1
0.7
3.3
0
1
0
8
10
30
0
0.1
0
0.7
0.9
2.6
0
0
4
7
5
36
0
0
0.3
0.6
0.4
3.0
in total received fewer than ten citations in law reviews in each five-year period.
The four marketing journals received, in total, roughly the same average num-
ber of citations as the top three strategy journals in each five-year period.
0
0
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groups, and hence would provide misleading statistics. That problem
is of least concern with respect to the journal citation count because
the top journals would seem both representative and relatively inclu-
sive, but it is of greater concern with respect to the scholar citations.8 2
Another challenge with the scholar counts is that the individuals are
chosen by achievement that is field-based (such as influence on 10
economics) rather than antitrust law-based (that is, influence on
antitrust law). This selection criterion focuses on the diffusion of big
ideas from each field and presumes that the ideas would be captured
through references made by scholars who are more directly engaged
with antitrust." Despite this caveat regarding scholar choice, it
appears that the scholar, journal, and concept counts tell a relatively
consistent story within the strategy field and IO categories.
Comparisons across the strategy field and 10 categories should
also be made cautiously. For example, the absolute numbers do not
adjust for the difference in the number of antitrust topics for which
the 10 and strategy literatures are relevant. For example, the strategy
literature has comparatively less to offer than 10 on topics such as
predicting the price effect of a merger. Finally, it is possible that some
strategy-based ideas will influence antitrust through 10 scholarship
but that the connection may be obscured because the fields use differ-
ent terminology to articulate the same or similar ideas.
82 The targeted journals in 10 included a general journal (American
Economic Review) that publishes articles relevant to the field and two top
field journals (RAND Journal of Economics and Journal of Industrial
Economics). The targeted journals in the strategy field included a general
journal (Harvard Business Review), the top strategy field journal (Strategic
Management Journal), and the top organizational management journal
(Administrative Science Quarterly). In this analysis, unlike Oberholzer-Gee
and Yao, we counted citations to Harvard Business Review only if the article
was clearly strategy oriented.
8 The list of targeted scholars was based on prominence in the field, such
as Nobel Prizes and Bates Clark medals in economics with recognized contribu-
tions to 10 and mention in top strategy "guru" lists, and is intended to be repre-
sentative of top producers of ideas in their respective fields. There are many
well-known scholars who have a substantial portion of their research directed to
antitrust law or have been very active as expert witnesses. These scholars gener-
ate higher citation rates in the antitrust literature, but present more difficult inter-
pretation issues and arguably a less reliable baseline for cross-year comparisons.
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V. DIFFUSION OF STRATEGY FRAMEWORKS AND
CONCEPTS TO ANTITRUST
We have argued that the strategy field appears to have influenced
antitrust law and policy to a lesser extent than warranted. Section V
explores the diffusion of strategy frameworks and concepts into
antitrust, with a particular emphasis on obstacles to such diffusion.'
We first examine how the characteristics of the strategy field's content
affects idea adoption in antitrust and then explore the conduits
through which its ideas may flow. Finally, we conclude with more
general considerations regarding the relationship between the strat-
egy field and antitrust going forward.
A. Content: Characteristics and idea adoption
Despite the strategy field's potential to augment antitrust analysis,
certain of the field's characteristics have impeded the diffusion and
adoption of its ideas. These include strategy's focus on firm rather
than market- or industry-oriented problems, its focus on explaining
profits rather than welfare outcomes, and the lack of strong consensus
regarding what factors are most important for explaining firm behav-
ior and profitability. Consequently, strategy's direct influence on
antitrust appears to have been relatively weak. Ironically, some of the
very characteristics that enable the strategy field to contribute to
antitrust discourse also appear to have diminished its influence.
* STRATEGY IS MOST USEFUL FOR FIRM- RATHER THAN MARKET-LEVEL DETERMI-
NATIONS: The extent to which a scholarly field influences legal dis-
course depends, in part, on the extent to which the field's core
concepts are both substantively relevant and sufficiently amenable to
incorporation within the legal system. Antitrust's primary objective is
to promote market competition. Pursuit of this objective requires
knowledge of how markets perform and what factors influence com-
petition. This knowledge is a primary focus of 10.5 In contrast, the
8 Spencer Weber Waller provides a very thoughtful discussion, which
spans the twentieth century, regarding the "many interlocking reasons why
business discourse has always taken a back seat to economic discourse in the
formulation and enforcement of antitrust policy." Waller, supra note 2, at 311.
See also Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 2.
8 See generally Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of
Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 492-504 (1983). Carstensen
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strategy field focuses on firms more than markets and generally
emphasizes questions relating to the creation of competitive advantage
through the configuration, development, and use of a firm's resources.
More generally, 10 focuses on the main market performance question
posed in an antitrust determination while strategy focuses on ques-
tions that illuminate components of that main question.
* STRATEGY FOCUSES ON PROFITS, NOT WELFARE: A field's contribution to
legal developments also depends on whether the field's insights are
tailored to addressing the questions that legal issues pose. Strategy
insights generally have not been either conceived or developed in
ways that directly reflect the welfare concerns of antitrust law." In
contrast to IO, the strategy field is oriented toward assessing the
implications of firm behavior for firm performance rather than for
social or consumer welfare. The lack of any significant effort to extend
or otherwise translate insights regarding firm performance to address
social welfare concerns has, therefore, likely impeded the influence of
these ideas on the antitrust community."
* STRATEGY, AS A FIELD, LACKS STRONG INTERNAL CONSENSUS: The influ-
ence of a social science theory on the law typically increases if the
theory is widely accepted within its field. As a multidisciplinary
field, strategy offers a variety of approaches to understanding com-
plex phenomena. This diversity, as reflected by its many schools of
thought, has generated strong internal debates regarding the rela-
tive importance of even factors that the strategy field as a whole
has identified as contributing to firm behavior and firm perform-
ance. While such debates may create a healthy atmosphere for
scholarly progress, they may also complicate and potentially
impede the incorporation of strategy teachings into antitrust law."
provides an excellent analysis of the relationship between IO and antitrust.
He characterizes IO's reliance upon microeconomic theory and analysis of
industry and firm behavior as having a "focus [that] corresponds closely to
the issues of antitrust concern." Id. at 492. This development was "not sur-
prising," according to Carstensen, since the economists who developed IO
were "very interested in the antitrust laws." Id. at 492 n.24.
86 But see R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT' A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984).
87 See, e.g., Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 2.
88 Cf. Waller, supra note 2, at 311-12 (noting that diversity of views char-
acterizing "academic business theory" and, as a consequence, the absence of
any "single business discourse that an antitrust outsider could readily iden-
tify and master .. . to unseat the dominant economic language in antitrust").
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In contrast, 10 has much greater within-field consensus, arguably
because of the field's relative maturity and the dominance of core
disciplinary assumptions from economics.
B. Conduits: Path dependence and idea adoption
The influence of a particular scholarly field on the law reflects not
only the intrinsic characteristics of the field's teachings and their rele-
vance to the key legal problems, but also the conduits for transmitting
those teachings. A principal conduit for the flow of ideas in antitrust
law is the members of its community who, in turn, are exposed to
various ideas depending on their training and the frameworks
through which they understand antitrust problems.
For the purpose of understanding the speed and adoption of
strategy field ideas, it is important to recognize that IO had been
adopted as the main social science foundation for antitrust long
before strategy matured as an academic field." By the 1990s, when
the strategy field had matured with its own distinct body of knowl-
edge, antitrust case law and policy discussions already reflected the
structure of 10 principles. Moreover, both academic and practicing
lawyers viewed antitrust law and policy through 10 frameworks
and IO economists had become an integral part of the antitrust
community.
Given IO's relative dominance in antitrust, the flow of strategy
ideas to antitrust has depended in large part on the exposure of 10-
oriented antitrust participants to strategy field ideas. One potentially
important channel for exposure involves economics scholars within
business schools or strategy departments who teach or research strat-
egy topics. Over the last two and a half decades, several such econom-
ics scholars have assumed leadership positions in the federal antitrust
89 The strategy field's major journal did not launch until 1980. To be
sure, many of the concepts that fall under the umbrella of strategy developed
within the context of general management or business policy in the academic
world and at various strategy consulting firms. See MARC ALLEN EISNER,
ANTITRUST AND THE TRIuMPH OF ECoNOMICS: INSITUTIONs, EXPERIENCE, AND POL-
ICY CHANGE (1991). Eisner argues that the integration of economists into the
Agencies resulted in "an institutional transmission belt" that connected the
Agencies with IO's intellectual developments. Id. at 18.
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agencies," and many more have served as experts on antitrust matters.
Such individuals have generally had a greater exposure to strategy
and management insights relative to their economics department
counterparts, and constitute likely conduits for diffusion of such
knowledge. Another channel for incorporating strategy the testimony
of business experts. Such testimony has the potential to prompt further
investigation into various strategy-oriented theories, especially when
10-oriented explanations are unavailable or unsatisfying.
For strategy ideas to influence the antitrust community, there must
be not only exposure, but also openness to the ideas. Whether mem-
bers of the IO-influenced antitrust community respond to strategy
ideas depends on a number of factors. As discussed, one factor is the
compatibility between the strategy idea and IO. One would expect, for
example, greater receptivity when the ideas are compatible with 10
(because, for example, they derive from common assumptions) than
when they are not. Another factor is the level of translation of terms
and concepts as well as further development that might be necessary
for the importation of ideas. Along these lines, one might expect that
some ideas originating in or inspired by the strategy field will be
developed and then adopted in the more familiar 10 form. Following
this logic of idea diffusion, the indirect translation and development
path may prove to be an effective means by which strategy ideas,
especially those complementary to 10, are adopted by antitrust law.
C. Future influence
If members of the antitrust community are the primary conduits
for strategy ideas, then 10's dominance should not necessarily
impede strategy's influence as long as its ideas do not conflict with
those of 10. But, if the strategy ideas at issue conflict with 10, or per-
haps are merely foreign to 10, some resistance may ensue. Stated
alternatively, complementary ideas (such as understanding of single-
firm actions, efficiencies, and remedies) would likely receive the least
resistance, whereas substitute ideas (such as theoretical ideas or empir-
9 Economists in antitrust agency leadership positions who have taught
in business schools or have taught strategy, or both, include Jonathan B.
Baker, Jeremy I. Bulow, Michael L. Katz, David Scheffman, Fiona M. Scott
Morton, Carl Shapiro, and Dennis A. Yao.
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ical findings that directly challenge conventional economic under-
standings of markets and firm behavior) would likely encounter the
most resistance.
As a source of complementary ideas and frameworks that facili-
tate deeper and more comprehensive interpretations of evidence, the
further adoption of strategy teachings would seem a natural progres-
sion for antitrust law and policy." In the merger context, for example,
we have illustrated how strategy and other business fields can
enhance analyses as well as help illuminate tough antitrust policy
questions by challenging existing wisdom and offering alternative
approaches. Strategy's provision of a more nuanced set of frame-
works for understanding strategic choice regarding maverick activity
or market entry constitute examples of the former, while the potential
use of competencies in assessing the implications of a merger for
innovation illustrates the latter. Moreover, we believe that strategy-
based insights will likely become increasingly important as key
antitrust determinations shift from industries characterized by sim-
pler production relationships, such as economies of scale, to those
industries characterized by complex innovation systems.
Unless the strategy field finds its own voice in antitrust matters, it
will likely remain somewhat beholden to 10 economists and IO-oriented
antitrust lawyers to identify and translate relevant strategy teachings.
One factor that would facilitate independent influence would be the
more conscious pursuit of overlapping research agendas between the
strategy and antitrust communities. Thus far, their shared interests
largely mirror the JO-strategy overlap. The strategy field itself has not
prioritized antitrust-related questions, nor has the antitrust commu-
nity substantially engaged the strategy community. Even if there is no
91 While the introduction of some knowledge from the strategy literature
seems clearly beneficial in terms of improving case-specific understandings,
one should recognize that incorporating this knowledge could lead to less
predictability and greater enforcement expense. A similar concern has engen-
dered a major debate in the antitrust community with regard to the introduc-
tion of increasingly more sophisticated and subtle economic theories into
antitrust analysis. The addition of business field concepts would have a simi-
lar effect, though with the added complication that some of the business field
concepts may conflict with economic ideas already reflected in the antitrust
law canons.
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change in strategy's substantive focus per se, the field of strategy can
still be more mindful of the antitrust community as an important
audience. At a minimum, strategy as a field should more directly
manage its literature's transmission and translation so as to facilitate
the antitrust community's awareness, understanding, and possible
use of strategy's insights.
An important and possibly more effective avenue, albeit more
indirect, through which strategy can contribute is the antitrust com-
munity's increasing interest in the implications of deviations from
rationality in decision making. In recent years, for example, many
long-standing concerns regarding bounded rationality and nonopti-
mizing decision making have reemerged under the banner of apply-
ing behavioral economics and psychology to antitrust.' We believe
that the strategy field is particularly well suited to contribute within
this context given its broad multidisciplinary foundation and its well-
developed knowledge of the role of behavioral factors on firm deci-
sion making. The strategy literature, as well as that of marketing and
other business fields, therefore provides excellent starting points from
which to infuse behaviorally motivated research into the issues rele-
vant to antitrust law.
92 See generally Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 573, 576-77 nn.7-10 (2013) (delineating in great detail numerous arti-
cles (including dedicated journal symposia), academic and professional pan-
els, and enforcement agencies and officials that "debate the merits and
demerits of behavioral antitrust"); Christopher Leslie, Can Antitrust Law
Incorporate Insights from Behavioral Economics?, 92 TEx. L. REV. 53 (2014) (pro-
viding a useful commentary on Tor's thoughtful article); James C. Cooper &
William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency
Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 779, 781 (2012) (applying bounded
rationality and other behavioral economics-related concepts to the antitrust
agencies to better understand these agencies and their personnel); Joshua
Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral
Antitrust, 33 CARDOzo L. REv. 1517, 1548 (2012) (arguing "behavioral antitrust
is not ready for prime time"); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the
Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 515 (2007)
(lamenting the absence of any federal court antitrust rulings citing behavioral
economics at the time of publication). The literature is voluminous and grow-
ing though, unfortunately, not in the manner we prescribe.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law's development, particularly in recent years, has
been one of increasing solicitude to the complexities of competition.
Broad swathes of conduct previously judged under a per se standard
are now subject to a rule of reason analysis. Heavy, at times disposi-
tive, reliance on gross market structure measures such as concentra-
tion has transitioned to more complicated theories of strategic
interaction that reflect some of IO's progress in understanding the
mechanisms of competition.
Such increased attention to the underlying mechanisms that
explain market outcomes, in turn, has increased the need for more in-
depth understanding of firm behavior. 10 has fueled much of this
increased attention and, in particular, has offered valuable insights
concerning competitive dynamics that shape market outcomes. 10
has been less successful, however, in providing sufficiently nuanced
understandings of firm behavior, the primary domain of research by
business fields such as strategy.
Both the opportunity and the need exist for antitrust law and
scholarship to better incorporate knowledge regarding firm behavior
from business fields such as strategy. Leveraging strategy-based
insights that are largely complementary to 10 should be compara-
tively straightforward. The bigger challenge may lie with the antitrust
community's willingness to engage seriously those strategy teachings
that question 10 and, by implication, challenge existing antitrust law.'
The modern evolution of antitrust law has largely corresponded,
albeit with a lag, to the evolution of economics generally and 10 in
particular. Strategy has strong roots in economics but it is not defined
by economics. The field of strategy has much to offer the antitrust
community, including its ability to serve as an example of how to
navigate the gravitational pull of economics.
9 Many antitrust doctrines, like other legal doctrines, reflect how society
understands the various elements that inform the doctrine and represent soci-
ety's best judgment of how to balance these oftentimes partially understood
elements. Hence, the introduction of more precise mechanisms or the replace-
ment of some doctrines with less precise but more accurate doctrines requires
attention to not only what is added but also to the effect of the change on the
overall balance of elements.

